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CHAPTER 3
Rightsizing Fiscal and Monetary Policies
Abstract This chapter discusses the right size of government in ﬁscal
terms – identifying characteristics of Budget Optimum – i.e., the para-
meters of ﬁscal policy that should contribute to the fast and sustainable
economic growth for the particular country in a particular time period.
In the ﬁrst part of the chapter it is argued that budget deﬁcit is not the
main parameter of Budget Optimum, but budget to GDP ratio and
public expenditure to budget should be examined much closer in
parallel with budget deﬁcit. In its second part, this chapter chronicles
Georgia’s economic recovery plan and its impact on key indicators –
making the case for anti-austerity. The third part of this chapter lays
out the broader institutional implications of the Georgian reform
experience and, suggesting that some rules are outdated, offers inno-
vative concepts – from the management of international ﬁnancial insti-
tutions to cooperation between central banks and governments.
Keywords Budget  Fiscal  Expenditure  Crisis  Formula
Governments can inﬂuence a country’s economy in two respects: at a
ﬁnancial and at a regulatory level. And I believe that for every country, and
at each stage of its development, there is a right size of government in both of
these respects. While lessons learned in one country should not blindly be
transferred to another, I am convinced that countries at similar levels of
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development can and should learn from their peers. In the previous chapter,
I discussed the economic beneﬁts of controlled deregulation. In the ﬁrst part
of this chapter (Sect. 3.1), I will examine the right size of the government in
its ﬁscal aspect offering a new concept of Budget Optimum – the main
characteristics of the budget (and not only budget deﬁcit) that can ensure
best economic outcome for that particular moment of that particular econ-
omy. In the second part of this chapter (Sect. 3.2), I will make the case of
how focusing on the parameters of the Budget Optimum (and not following
austerity measures, as advised by many) helped Georgia to recover from the
2008/2009 recession and how this approach may be useful for many
countries currently facing austerity measures. In the third part of this chapter
(Sect. 3.3), I will examine some of the institutional implications of the
experience in Georgia that may be helpful for many developing as well as
developed countries in shaping their ﬁscal and monetary policies during the
new economic realities.
I believe there is a Budget Optimum for any economy and it differs
based on its level of development and its position in economic cycle. The
parameters of Budget Optimum do not take in consideration many bud-
getary aspects and do not depend only on budget deﬁcit as a main para-
meter and main measurement of a healthy ﬁscal policy, but depend on (1)
budget to GDP ratio, (2) public expenditure to budget ratio, and lastly (3)
the budget deﬁcit as well. I believe that for any economy Budget
Optimum can be identiﬁed, which will ensure, ceteris paribus, that econ-
omy’s fastest and most sustainable growth.
3.1 RIGHTSIZING THE GOVERNMENT – BUDGET OPTIMUM
The Georgian case is practical proof that economist Albert Laffer’s theory
about the relation between taxation and government revenues is right -
The bell-shaped “Laffer curve is a representation of the relationship
between rates of taxation and the resulting levels of government revenue.
[ . . . ] One implication of the Laffer Curve is that increasing tax rates
beyond a certain point will be counterproductive for raising further tax
revenue,”1 i.e., there is a speciﬁc level of taxation that maximizes tax
revenue. Others argue that the curve may not be bell-shaped and that it
might even have multiple peaks.2
In the 2000s Georgia saw two major tax reforms: one in 2004 and one in
2009. As part of the ﬁrst reform, the number of taxes was reduced and the
rates of the remaining taxes were lowered. Most observers predicted a
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decline in tax revenue but the opposite happened. Tax revenue went up,
both in nominal terms and as a percentage of GDP. In nominal terms, tax
revenue went from GEL 0.6 billion in 2003 to GEL 6.3 billion in 2013. Of
course, GDP growth and inﬂation contributed to this development. But the
relative development of tax revenue conﬁrms that the reforms were success-
ful. Tax revenue as a percentage of GDP went from 7 percent in 2003 to 24
percent in 2012. The impact was already apparent within one year of the
ﬁrst round of reforms.
The reasons for this success are two-fold: improved administration,3
namely: the ﬁght against corruption in the revenue service department as
discussed in the previous chapter; and a realistic tax burden that reﬂected
Georgia’s level of development at the time. Before the reforms, the burden
was simply too high. Any company attempting to pay the full amount of
their tax liability would either have gone bankrupt right away or dug their
own grave by increasing prices to an extent that would eventually have
driven customers away. Note that Georgia’s GDP per capita only came to
about USD 922 at the time (World Bank, 2003). So, paradoxical as it
sounds, the reduction of the tax level triggered higher tax revenue in
Georgia, indicating that the country’s pre-reform tax burden was too far
towards the right (or the top, depending on the orientation of the graph)
on the Laffer curve (Fig. 3.1).
But how can a government determine the appropriate level of govern-
mental revenue as a percentage of GDP? Conceptually speaking, the
suitable tax level for any country is that which minimizes corruption and
maximizes long-term economic growth without compromising social or
political stability. In Georgia, a new tax code was introduced in 2004.
Only 6 out of 21 types of taxes remained: two consumption-based taxes,
three income-based taxes, and one property-based tax:
1. Consumption-based: Value-added tax (VAT; 18 percent) and cus-
toms clearance tax (0/5/15 percent; more than 80 percent of
imported goods were cleared at a customs rate of 0 percent)
2. Income-based: Corporate income tax (proﬁt tax; 20 percent, later
decreased to 15 percent), dividend tax (5 percent), and personal
income tax (25 percent, later decreased to 20 percent)
3. Property-based: Property tax (land tax; up to 1 percent of the value).
On top of these taxes, duties (levies) were introduced for as few as four
types of products: tobacco, gas, alcohol, and scrap metal exports. All of
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these taxes were ﬂat to incentivize compliance. Any progressive system
(“the more you earn, the more you pay”) eventually gives rise to corrup-
tion; both private individuals and companies will get creative to move into
lower tax brackets than warranted by their actual income. What is more, a
progressive rate punishes success and, hence, discourages citizens from
earning more money and companies from generating higher proﬁts. But in
a poor country, you need every incentive that rewards productivity and
discourages corruption.
The simple, ﬂat-rate tax system helped Georgia streamline its tax
administration and ﬁght corrupt practices in the revenue service depart-
ment. Also, simpliﬁcation of the tax system facilitated increase in the
degree of compliance and enabled the creation of a relatively level playing
ﬁeld for the private sector. The combined impact of a lower tax burden, a
simpler tax code, the successful ﬁght against corruption, and the creation
of a level playing ﬁeld soon led to higher rates of proﬁt and reinvestment.
As a result, Georgia attracted foreign investment, GDP rose, and new,
higher-paying jobs were created (Fig. 3.2).
Budget to GDP ratio may be the most important aspect of Budget
Optimum. When identifying the most optimal Budget to GDP ratio, the
factors to be taken into consideration include a country’s stage of eco-
nomic development, level of corruption, volume of international trade,
and GDP composition. Database research spanning two and a half dec-
ades, since 1980, shows that none of the 18 countries (mentioned in the
ﬁrst chapter) that at any stage of this period had a fast economic growing
decade4 has had a general government revenue (Percent of GDP)5 to
GDP ratio of more than 40 percent; Belarus is the only exception from
this rule. Majority of the countries, including Georgia, have had a budget
to GDP ratio of below 30 percent, and 5 countries had this ratio between
30 and 40 percent. On the ﬂipside, none of the 23 countries that had a
ten-year average general government revenue to GDP ratio of more than
40 percent got anywhere close to doubling GDP per capita in terms of
purchasing power parity, or to quadrupling nominal GDP per capita in any
ten-year period. These observations might partly be explained by the fact
that many of the big spenders are developed countries. The high social
obligations that come with their advanced stage of development make it
hard for them to keep the budget below 40 percent of GDP, and the
maturity of their economies makes it hard for them to achieve fast growth.
In any case, a developing country that aspires to catch up with the devel-
oped world cannot afford to place a high tax burden on the economy.







































































































































































3.1.1 Forward-Looking Fiscal Policy
One way of gradually decreasing the tax burden as a percentage of GDP is
to increase government expenditure at a rate that is slower than GDP
growth. But there is another way of achieving the same objective, and I
believe it is more effective in terms of building conﬁdence among market
participants and fostering economic growth, an approach I call forward-
looking ﬁscal policy. This requires the government to deﬁne and publish a
formula according to which the tax burden will be decreased by x percent
for every percent of GDP growth for a speciﬁed number of years. In other
words, all market participants are incentivized to contribute to overall
economic growth and are rewarded accordingly. The reduction can be
applied, for example, to income tax, corporation tax, or value-added tax.
In some cases, e.g., in an economic crisis, it may be necessary to
introduce sectorial taxes, i.e., taxes that only apply to certain industry
sectors. In such a situation, I recommend applying the forward-looking
approach to the banking sector: decrease the bank tax by x percent for
every percent increase in GDP. Why the banking sector? Because banks are
enablers of economic growth. Increasing lending and ﬁnancing activity
creates beneﬁts for the economy as a whole. This kind of formula moti-
vates the right people to do the right things, aligning all stakeholders to
contribute to increased economic activity. Not only does it help bring
down the budget, it also sends a strong signal to the private sector. The
formula has not been tested in Georgia, and I am not aware of any country
in which it has. Yet I am conﬁdent that the forward-looking approach
could promote faster recovery from a crisis. Skeptics typically object that
banks will always ﬁnance sufﬁciently attractive projects, so why introduce
an additional incentive? But forward-looking ﬁscal policy is not about any
particular project. It is about an overall boost to conﬁdence when con-
ﬁdence is needed most. I will explore the economic relevance of psychol-
ogy and perception in a crisis in more detail in the argument against
austerity presented later in the chapter.
3.1.2 One Budget Principle
Another important aspect for rightsizing the government, ensuring the
most efﬁcient ﬁscal policy and thus contributing to Budget Optimum is
One Budget Principle, which was adopted by the Georgian government
in 2004. In most countries, big parts of government income are
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earmarked, i.e., reserved for speciﬁc types of expenditure. For example,
road taxes and levies are often collected based on usage. In France, fees
are collected at dedicated toll stations. In Germany, taxes are collected
by oil companies through gas stations as a percentage of the price per
liter of gas sold. In turn, most countries dedicate taxes collected from
road users to the construction of new roads and to the maintenance of
the existing network. In Georgia, we opted out of such earmarking of
income from speciﬁc sources for expenditure in speciﬁc areas. All public
revenue go into one budget, and all expenditure is ﬁnanced irrespective
of the source of the revenue. The “one budget” principle protects
citizens from taxes and levies imposed by competing arms of govern-
ment, and it increases the agility of government when it comes to public
spending.
Take the hotel levy, a duty that is common in many countries.
Typically, it goes directly to the ministry or department of tourism,
and it is spent to ﬁnance advertising campaigns or improve tourism
infrastructure. Taken at face value, this allocation appears logical, and it
makes it easier to justify a given tax to the public: Tourists should pay
for tourism infrastructure, and road users should pay for the road net-
work. But in reality, such levies are rarely sufﬁcient to ﬁnance the
respective expenditure in full. What is more, roads do not only beneﬁt
car owners, but also those who buy and sell any goods that are trans-
ported on roads. These effects render the original argument for ear-
marking practically irrelevant. Moreover, the practice of earmarking has
several disadvantages:
• Unhealthy competition among cabinet members and government
agencies to create independent sources of income at the expense of
the private sector.
• Unnecessarily complex levy systems that give rise to uncertainty and
discourage investments –Will there be a new minister who will try to
introduce a new levy?
• Inefﬁcient use of government resources – The full cost of adminis-
trating a complex levy system can easily exceed the revenues it
generates.
• Sub-optimal use of government funds – At any given time, there may
be more important, or more urgent, projects than the one a given
levy is earmarked for at the time.
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In stable times, such inﬂexibility may merely be seen as inconvenient. But
in a crisis, earmarking can become life threatening for the national
economy. Imagine the government urgently needs to stabilize the bank-
ing sector, but the substantial funds generated from the hotel levy are
reserved for staff training in the hospitality sector.
I do not suggest that all levies or excise taxes should necessarily be
abolished, although I am convinced that minimizing the number of taxes
and surtaxes is good for any economy. Rather, I recommend allocating all
government income to one budget. This central budget should be used
for the most efﬁcient, or most urgent projects, irrespective of how the
income was originally generated. There is one exception to this principle
though: those agencies that are in direct contact with citizens, i.e., provi-
ders of public services. Such citizen-facing agencies should be allowed to
keep part of their income as it creates incentives for them to improve their
performance and additional motivation for their staff to provide better
service. This will help them evolve from self-serving civil servants into
customer-oriented service providers.
Georgia’s implementation of the “one budget” principle immediately
had the desired effects. Government agencies stopped competing for ever
more creative ways to plague the private sector with new duties and levies.
Instead, they started competing for the allocation of funds from the
budget by developing, proposing, and executing competitive projects.
Government became more efﬁcient, more effective, and generally more
results-oriented. And as times got tougher, the government had the extra
ﬂexibility it needed to take swift and decisive action. Unfortunately, the
one budget principle has since been softened. In late 2010, some govern-
ment agencies were allowed to keep their surplus and spend it on projects
identiﬁed by the respective ministers, a change that let sectarianism and
inefﬁciency creep back in.
3.1.3 Public Investment Ratio vs. Budget Deﬁcit
Despite the successful reforms, economic growth in Georgia stalled in
2009. This was due to the combined effects of the world ﬁnancial crisis
that had started in 2007 and the Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008. The
inﬂux of foreign capital had gone into a sharp decline. The situation was
further aggravated by a local political crisis in early 2009. An opposition
rally that lasted almost three months had brought economic activity at the
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center of Georgia’s capital, Tbilisi, to a virtual standstill. The economy was
heading into sharp recession.
As was expected, recommendations came from every corner to start
austerity measures. Typically, austerity has two components:
1. Focus on the budget deﬁcit, i.e., the degree to which public expen-
diture exceeds public revenue, as the principal indicator of economic
health.
2. A policy to maintain or decrease the budget deﬁcit level at all cost,
typically by increasing taxes and reducing public spending across the
board.
Ever since the worldwide ﬁnancial crisis, budgetary austerity has been
widely recommended to troubled countries globally. Many governments
have followed this advice, and most of them have paid dearly. Most
recently, Princeton economist and Nobel laureate Paul Krugman has
argued that “all of the economic research that allegedly supported the
austerity push has been discredited.”6 Yet austerity still features promi-
nently in recovery plans for countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain, and
the Ukraine.7
Based on my experience in Georgia, I argue against both components
of austerity as deﬁned previously. In particular, I will demonstrate that
undifferentiated austerity is not a suitable course of action for a country in
a recession.8 More generally, I believe that the budget deﬁcit as an
aggregate ﬁgure is insufﬁcient as an indicator of economic health.
Speciﬁcally, I argue that IFIs put too much emphasis on the deﬁcit as an
absolute indicator out of context, when they should rather be looking at
its development relative to other economic indicators and more impor-
tantly at a public investment ratio (public investment to budget). The
Georgian experience shows that a high budget deﬁcit is temporarily
acceptable and can even be necessary to allow a country recover from
recession, provided a substantial share of the budget consists of public
investment. In Georgia, public investment accounted for up to 25 percent
of the budget. This allowed the Georgian government to increase the
budget deﬁcit to 9.2 percent and then to bring it back down to 3 percent
within 2 years. In a recession, public investment can be decreased much
more easily politically than other budget positions, e.g., by stretching
investment projects over a longer period of time than originally foreseen,
or by canceling some projects altogether. What is more, public investment
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has a much higher multiplier effect on the economy as a whole than other
budgetary expenditures, and it contributes to the development of the
private sector as well. If external observers and advisers, including the
IFIs, assess a country’s performance based on the budget deﬁcit alone,
they miss out on an important part of the picture. Before putting pressure
on a government to reduce the budget deﬁcit, which can have a negative
effect on economic development, they should also take into consideration
the public investment share in the budget and the effect it has on the
economy as a whole.
3.2 TAKING A RISK WITH ANTI-AUSTERITY
When Georgia was on the brink of a sharp economic slump in the begin-
ning of 2009, our government opted against austerity. Instead of raising
taxes and cutting public spending, Georgia chose to take the path of
controlled expansionary monetary and ﬁscal policy. In early 2009, the
government and the National Bank of Georgia made a joint statement,
announcing a tax reduction, an increase of the budget deﬁcit, decrease in
social expenditure but signiﬁcant surge in public investment and a number
of banking regulation measures that would make it easier and cheaper for
private companies to borrow money (in parallel policy rate was reduced
signiﬁcantly from 12 percent in Q3 of 2008 to 5 percent in Q4 2009). In
many ways, this was the direct opposite of austerity – the measure that
many had advised. But we felt we didn’t have a choice. With memories of
the recent Russian invasion still fresh, all the leading players in Georgia’s
private sector were even more scared than those in neighboring countries.
Both the government and the National Bank were convinced that announ-
cing austerity measures would have driven the country into an even deeper
recession, and possibly into eventual bankruptcy. That was my crucible as
Minister of Finance. I took a chance by decreasing the income tax rate
from 20 percent to 15 percent, instead of increasing taxes. My decision
was based on meticulous calculations, but many experts had advised me
against it. The reduction took effect in 2009, on January 1. Six weeks later,
I was appointed Prime Minister. At the time, Georgia’s economy was
shrinking at a rate of −8.7 percent. I guess this was why nobody else
wanted the job.
Georgia opted against austerity and quickly regained its footing. By the
end of 2009, GDP decline was down to −3.9 percent, lower than in any
other country in the region, and Georgia was the ﬁrst among its peers to
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recover in 2010 with a growth rate of 6.4 percent. What is more, the
budget deﬁcit was brought back down to pre-crisis levels within two years’
time after the joint declaration of what is now frequently referred to as the
Fast Economic Recovery Plan. The debt to GDP ratio, which had tem-
porarily increased to more than 40 percent, was brought back down to
34 percent. When I retired from the position of prime minister in 2012,
Georgia’s economy (in that quarter) grew at a rate of 8.2 percent. Within
three years period a turnaround from −8.7 percent (second quarter of
2009) to +8.2 percent was made (second quarter of 2012) – nothing short
of an economic miracle (Fig. 3.3).
3.2.1 What Georgia Did
One of the ﬁrst and most drastic measures we took was to cut taxes.
Starting in 2004, the tax code had already been simpliﬁed dramatically.
But instead of returning to pre-reform tax rates to balance the budget, as
many other governments have chosen to do in similar situations, taxes
were further reduced (Fig. 3.4).
Additionally, we allowed the budget deﬁcit to increase – not at randomor
permanently though, but in a highly targeted fashion and for a limited period
of time. The deﬁcit went from 4.8 percent in 2007 to 6.4 percent in 2008
and 9 percent in 2009, albeit for one year only. Within two years of reaching
its peak, the deﬁcit was brought back down to 3.6 percent in 2011 and to 2.8
percent in 2012. All additional expenditure was allocated to infrastructure,
such as highways and high-voltage power lines – projects that had the
potential to generate additional private sector activity. Examples include
the construction of a new high-voltage power line connecting the
Georgian energy grid to the Turkish energy grid, enabling Georgia to export
electricity generated from hydropower to Turkey and attract investments in
the construction of new power plants in Georgia. Public investment as a
percentage of the total budget went from 20 percent in the late 2000s to 25
percent in 2012. At the same time, social subsidies and the government’s
payroll bill were reduced. Only these cuts were in line with the austerity
measures proposed by many, and they were deemed necessary at the time to
free up as much capital as possible for public investment.
Other components of the recovery plan included the privatization of
state-owned enterprises and the issuing of Eurobonds on international
ﬁnancial markets to attract more foreign funds and accelerate the moderni-
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Georgian Railways and the Georgian Oil and Gas Corporation issued
Eurobonds at the London Stock Exchange. The proceeds helped us ﬁnance
additional infrastructure projects and draw more international capital.9 In
parallel, banking sector regulation was loosened to make it easier for
Georgian banks to ﬁnance recovery at ﬁrst and then renewed growth.
3.2.2 Why It Worked
The Fast Economic Recovery Plan was a resounding success. Georgia
quickly came out of the recession. I believe that this lasting success owes
as much to psychology as it owes to economics. In a recession, everybody
is scared. Consumers fear unemployment and tax increases. As a result,
they stop spending and start saving, reducing the size of the economy
almost immediately. Private sector players, fearing instability, will hold off
on major investments and postpone new hires, curbing GDP growth and
driving up the unemployment rate. Foreign investors fear for their capital
and ﬂock to other countries. In other words, fear is the biggest enemy of
the national economy in a recession.
While I respect all economic theories, and the sophisticated concepts
economists have come up with to explain economic development, I am
convinced that the behavior of individuals and markets is best explained by
looking at their perceptions. The economy is driven by the perception of its
participants, and the most important participant is the private sector.
I believe that governments cannot create jobs in the long term or drive
economic growth all by themselves. But what governments can do is create
an environment in which entrepreneurs have the conﬁdence to invest and
create jobs. So the best thing the government can do in a recession is to foster
stability, or at least the perception of stability. A recession can have many
causes – an ineffective government; inadequate regulation; or external fac-
tors, such as geopolitical issues or trade wars. Regardless of what those
reasons are, the best thing the government can do is to create a sense of
stability and predictability. In a recession, entrepreneurs are especially scared,
and they have every right to be scared. They don’t know to what extent the
economic decline will affect their companies, their personal income, and
their lives. They don’t know how long the situation will last. They
don’t know how the government will react. Many theorists will say that
this is precisely what being an entrepreneur is all about – dealing with
uncertainty and hedging risks. But why create additional uncertainty when
the government can contribute to engendering stability?
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Consumer conﬁdence is a crucial driver of recovery. But most consu-
mers don’t pay much attention to government policy, let alone GDP
growth rates. Their perception of the economic situation is shaped by the
private sector. Are the revenues of the companies they work for declining?
Do they see worried looks on the faces of their bosses and colleagues? Is
there talk of downsizing? Are their friends and family members losing their
jobs? Are they personally in danger of being let go by their employers? Any
of these signs will cause them to stop spending and start saving. The same is
true for public servants. If they see budgetary revenue go down and the
government start making budget cuts, they will fear for their jobs.
So nerves in the private sector are understandably frayed in a recession.
Entrepreneurs need to adjust to a new reality, and their main concern is
the lack of predictability. Consumers are apprehensive too. They start
saving instead of spending. This triggers a vicious circle of economic
decline. If, on top of all this, the government announces austerity mea-
sures, even more uncertainty, and ultimately chaos will ensue.
It is my ﬁrm belief that the worst thing that any government can do in a
recession is to create or increase uncertainty.When someEuropean countries
announced austerity measures during the ﬁnancial crisis, they set off a down-
ward spiral even before the measures were enacted. Fear of tax increases,
instability, and unemployment turned into a self-fulﬁlling prophecy.10
Examples include Greece, Portugal, Spain, and many other countries.
During a recession, governments should not be forced to decrease their
budget deﬁcit by cutting expenditure and increasing taxes. Budget cuts
will only aggravate the situation, chieﬂy because governments will be
inclined to decrease public investments rather than social expenditure
because social cuts are unpopular with the electorate. Tax increases also
have a detrimental effect, since they make it even harder for private
enterprises to generate a proﬁt and stay in business without succumbing
to illegal practices. Higher taxes also make the economy as a whole less
efﬁcient by shifting funds from the more efﬁcient private sector to the less
efﬁcient public sector. Instead, governments should decrease social expen-
diture, and they should be allowed to increase their budget deﬁcits tem-
porarily, even through higher debt, to ﬁnance public investment that drive
additional private sector activity and reduce taxes. Depending on a coun-
try’s debt proﬁle, the higher budget deﬁcit could be ﬁnanced through
international ﬁnancial institutions or ﬁnancial markets. This will initially
increase a country’s debt to GDP ratio, but the recovery typically brings it
back to a healthy level within few years. Sadly, many countries were forced
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to decrease budget deﬁcits expecting their debt to GPD ratios to fall in the
last ﬁnancial crisis. This led to a decline in economic activity and negative
growth or stagnation. As a result, debt to GDP ratios are not coming
down as quickly as they would have with the help of temporary expan-
sionary policies. In many cases, the debt to GDP ratio actually increased
because of the decline in economic activity (Fig. 3.5).
InGeorgia’s case, the decision to keep spending even under duress sent a
signal of stability and engendered conﬁdence among all market partici-
pants.11 By decreasing taxes and focusing public expenditure on infrastruc-
ture, rather than social subsidies, we sent a clear message: the government is
committed to the creation of a stable environment for domestic enterprise,
foreign investment, and private consumption. We even loosened banking
regulations and monetary policy. We issued Eurobonds to ﬁnance more
infrastructure projects and compensate for the foreign direct investment
that had dried up in the aftermath of the Russian invasion. The perception
these measures created were at least as important as their direct economic
impact: we have reached the low point. Fromnowon, we are on the way up.
Good times are ahead of us, and we will come out of the recession very
soon. In record time, this perception became the new reality. The recession
lasted only a few months. Businesses started to invest in growth and hire
more people. Consumers became more conﬁdent and started to spend
money again, rather than hoard it. As a result, Georgia averted bankruptcy
and came out of the recession within just one year, faster than any other
country in a similar situation. The psychological effects of the government’s
actions helpedGeorgia overcome its double trouble long before our invest-
ments could have taken actual economic effect. Of course structural
reforms, cuttign red tape, improving governemnt services, increasing
state institutions’ efﬁcienies that had already been government’s priotiy
has also contributed signiﬁcantly to the fast recovery.
In other countries facing similar challenges, talk of austerity measures
created a growing fear of budget cuts, higher taxes, less economic pre-
dictability, increased unemployment, and declining consumer spending.
By announcing austerity measures, governments in those countries set
off a vicious cycle of negative perception, often before the measures were
even implemented. Had the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and its
associates been less concerned with the sheer short-term budget deﬁcit
and more mindful of the total structure of the budget (including budget
to GDP and public expenditure to GDP – Budget Optimum) and simple
structural reforms, the situation would have been very different in many











































































































































countries still stagling with economic recovery. Looking ahead, my
advice to governments is to exercise prudence and create a ﬁnancial
cushion by keeping the deﬁcit low when the economy is growing.
In a nutshell, here is how Georgia overcame the recession without
submitting to blunt austerity as recommended by IFIs:
• Repeated tax and customs simpliﬁcation and reduction
• Controlled, temporary budget deﬁcit increase despite the crisis and
adopting One Busget principle
• Re-allocation of funds from social expenditure to investment in
infrastructure
• Focus on the ratio of investment to budget, rather than on budget
deﬁcit alone
• Privatization of state-owned enterprises
• Issuing Eurobonds for remaining public assets to raise additional
funds
• Deregulation of the private sector and structural reforms
• Special rules for the banking sector to increase its lending capabilities
While governments may not be able to create jobs in the long run, govern-
ment policy can create an environment in which entrepreneurial activity will
ﬂourish and consumers will be sufﬁciently conﬁdent to spend what they
make. Whatever the cause of a given recession, the best any government
can do is help create a sense of economic stability. When people panic, things
start falling apart.
3.3 INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
Based on the experience of ﬁghting recession, creating new formulas for
economic recovery and growth, and analyzing the fast changing economic
environment, few innovative concepts can be shaped in regard to ﬁscal and
monetary policies. Most theoretical economists purport that foreign ﬁnan-
cial aid is a good thing for a country in distress, that there must be a
Chinese Wall between central banks and governments, and that inﬂation is
a bad thing. Practical economists, however, should be prepared to chal-
lenge such textbook paradigms in light of the real-life situation in a given
country at a given time. Based on my experience in Georgia, I show in
what follows that sometimes foreign aid comes with so many strings
attached that it is as much a burden as it is a blessing, at least until the
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government takes control to shape the agenda and coordinate the con-
tributions of foreign donors. Furthermore, I argue that, although the
independence of central banks must be preserved, some measure of ofﬁcial
cooperation between central banks and governments can be beneﬁcial,
and that moderate inﬂation (higher than most of the Central Banks
currently are targeting for) can be a good thing.
3.3.1 IFI Assistance Can Be a Liability
IFIs have fairly deep pockets. If their resources are put to good use, they
can make a huge difference for a developing world – improve existing
infrastructure, boost private sector activity, and increase the conﬁdence of
entrepreneurs and investors. And working with IFIs is not only a source of
ﬁnancing, it also provides an opportunity to learn from international
experience. Unfortunately, many governments do not fully understand
the mechanisms of IFI ﬁnancing and fail to utilize it properly. Without
proper coordination by the government of the receiving country, IFI
projects have a tendency to take on a life of their own. In fact, the
bureaucratic burden can outweigh the actual beneﬁt. This is what hap-
pened in Georgia in the early 2000s. But when the government took
control of the agenda and started pulling the right levers in a coordinated
fashion, the productivity of the assistance soared. After the Russian inva-
sion of Georgia and the donor conference held in Brussels in October
2008, IFI assistance was handled with aplomb and efﬁciency by everyone
involved, resident IFI representatives and members of government alike. It
was a successful joint effort. Although it took more than half a decade for
the aid to take effect, the political and economic support was a major
factor in getting the country back on track. But this was years later, and
Georgia had to climb a steep learning curve to get there.
3.3.1.1 Lack of Coordination
As soon as the new Georgian government was appointed in 2004, we
realized that IFIs had set aside substantial ﬁnancial resources for
Georgia but that these resources were not used efﬁciently. The reason
for the inefﬁciency was two-fold: IFIs were not sufﬁciently coordinat-
ing their work with the government, and each IFI wanted to partici-
pate in as many projects as possible. Unless the government takes
charge and deﬁnes the agenda, IFIs end up competing with each
other, or even with themselves internally, trying to maximize
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everything that will make them look active and involved: the number
of loans and grants they disburse, the number of areas pre-approved
for assistance, and the number of conditions and stipulations imposed
on a given loan or grant. Without proper oversight and coordination,
this tendency can turn foreign aid into a race that is more about the
formal scores and check marks than about the actual outcomes. Even
today, many governments are struggling with this issue.
3.3.1.2 Conﬂicts of Interest
In Georgia, we found that representatives of different IFIs went from door
to door at ministries and government agencies, trying to persuade them to
take advantage of yet another loan or grant. In many cases, different IFIs
offered funding to the same institution to address the same issue, only
under different titles. Initially, the members of the new government were
more than happy to accept such grants or special loans. But after a few
months, we began to understand that there were many strings attached to
these apparent acts of charity. In my own experience, grants can do even
more harm than loans if they are not managed properly. This is because
grants are typically contingent on the introduction of new regulation or
changes to existing ones. These regulatory initiatives are driven by an IFI’s
own policy, rather than by the agenda of the government of the receiving
country. Once a given policy has worked in one country, decision makers
at IFI headquarters are inclined to prescribe it to every other country.
Resident representatives of IFIs, eager to please their higher-ups by pro-
moting the in-house agenda, will push such policies onto the government.
In Georgia, this often led to conﬂicts of interest. IFIs would advocate one
thing, but Georgia needed another.
When we brought up the issue, IFIs said that their grants were not
part of the government’s budget anyway. Their representatives pro-
mised they would do the necessary research, pay for the experts, and
even draft the required legislation or regulation. At ﬁrst sight, it’s a
compelling argument: advanced regulation, based on best practices, is
introduced at no cost to the state. But when you take a closer look,
this arrangement is not such a good deal. The opportunity cost is
substantial:
• The funds allocated to a project driven by an IFI’s agenda could be
used for another cause that is in line with the agenda of the elected
government. But if the government doesn’t make a dedicated effort
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to coordinate and prioritize, IFIs will proceed with their projects
based on approval from a particular institution, agency, or ofﬁcial,
rather than from the government per se.
• Each additional project takes up a little more of the government’s
human resources. What is more, high-caliber civil servants often quit
their jobs to join the ranks of IFIs, which pay higher salaries than the
governments of most developing countries can afford, often for less
work. Both effects weaken the government.
• The urge to introduce new regulation puts an additional burden on
the government itself. Once their money is spent, IFIs will lobby to
have the new regulation signed into law and bring up the issue at any
meeting with ofﬁcials. Resident IFI representatives themselves are
often under pressure from their respective headquarters to deliver on
a given cause or policy change, regardless of the actual value it creates
for a country’s economy in a given situation.
That said, governments are at least as much to blame for these problems
as the IFIs. It is the responsibility of the government to make sure that
IFIs work closely with them and align their efforts with the govern-
mental agenda. If this process of coordination and communication is
not sufﬁciently clear and determined, IFIs will take things into their
own hands.
As soon as these hidden costs and side effects were properly under-
stood, the Georgian government started making a big effort, and spent a
lot of time and resources, pushing back against regulations that were in
conﬂict with the government’s agenda, or not sufﬁciently aligned with
Georgia’s stage of development. Sometimes we succeeded, sometimes we
didn’t. Examples include:
• An IFI had dedicated ﬁnancial resources to drafting a law that
makes third-party insurance obligatory. While such regulation may
be relevant and beneﬁcial in other countries, Georgia at the time
was not at the stage of development that would have warranted
the introduction of obligatory third-party insurance. What is
more, we were opposed to any obligatory schemes as a matter
of principle.
• Another IFI had drafted regulation regarding deposit insurance.
Georgia had never had deposit insurance regulation before, and it
was not introduced despite the IFI’s continued efforts and
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warnings. Nevertheless, thanks to sound banking regulation,
Georgia was one of very few countries that did not suffer a single
bankruptcy of a bank during the world ﬁnancial crisis (2007–
2009). Almost every other country in the region experienced
such bankruptcies, and many of them had trouble protecting or
refunding deposits, although they had deposit insurance schemes
in place.
• In another case, an IFI spent USD 40 million on what their repre-
sentatives referred to as business environment support. But none of
the members of the Georgian government involved in improving the
business environment can recall any contribution from this project.
What everybody remembers, however, is that the project absorbed
massive ﬁnancial resources and kept many of Georgia’s ﬁnest civil
servants occupied for almost four years.
• There was also an IFI that proposed a new law that would govern
tourism, including a long tail of regulations and guidelines, such
as Western-style certiﬁcation standards for hotels and restaurants.
At the time, however, Georgia’s tourism infrastructure was not
ready for such regulation. All it would have brought is additional
obstacles for investors in the hospitality sector, additional
expenses for existing businesses, and additional need for govern-
ment oversight that might well have given rise to a new wave of
corruption. We stopped the introduction of this regulation, and
the development of the tourism sector has proven us right. Today,
tourism is widely regarded as one of Georgia’s most dynamic
sectors. The number of visitors to Georgia increased from
350,000 in 2004 to 5 million in 2012 – without any complex
tourism legislation.
Of course, there were also some examples of effective IFI initiatives
in Georgia. Whenever IFI efforts were closely coordinated with the
government, and the government was able to implement the respective
reforms, the results were very positive. For example, the voucher ﬁnan-
cing scheme for schools had been suggested by IFIs as early as the
year 2000. But the government at the time was unable to conduct the
deep reforms that were required for the scheme to succeed. When
the new government made education reform one of its top priorities
and reversed the ﬂow of ﬁnancing from schools to students, the scheme
was a big success.
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3.3.1.3 Issues with Loans
As far as IFI loans are concerned, there are two main issues: competition
and fragmentation. As investors, IFIs partly compete with the private
sector and local ﬁnancial institutions, instead of cooperating with them,
as they should. What is more, their activity is often all over the place,
rather than focused on the areas that are most important to the devel-
opment of a given country. In Georgia, the IFIs were so eager to utilize
the resources they had set aside for the country that they started to
compete with and crowd out the private sector, thereby disrupting the
market and hindering the development of a free economy. Because they
have access to substantial funds at low interest rates, IFIs can afford to
cherry-pick the most promising projects, often snatching them from local
ﬁnancial institutions. But the idea is for IFIs to cooperate with the local
economy, not to compete with it. Additionally, IFIs strive to build as
diverse a portfolio of relatively small loans as possible, sometimes regard-
less of the real priorities for a given country at a given time. In many
cases, multiple IFIs were pushing loans on the government in the same
area. And they all wanted to have their own, dedicated project imple-
mentation unit and get involved in as many regulatory discussions as
possible. From the perspective of resident IFI employees, this behavior is
quite understandable: they were simply hedging their bets. By investing
in as many projects as possible, they would always be able to report some
success to their respective headquarters, even if the majority of projects
fell through. This proliferation created a lot of friction, distraction, and
inefﬁciency at a time when what Georgia needed most was focus.
3.3.1.4 The Special Coordination Team
How did we solve the problem? By creating a clear format for cooperation.
We set up a special coordination team as the sole gatekeeper for all IFI
projects. The team consisted of members of all ministries and agencies
receiving IFI grants or loans, as well as of all IFI representatives. It was
headed by the minister of ﬁnance. In special cases, the prime minister
himself got involved. Based on negotiations in the coordination team,
speciﬁc projects were assigned to speciﬁc IFIs, and these IFIs were dis-
couraged from participating in other projects. For example, it was agreed
that most of the World Bank’s funds would be spent on road infrastructure
in East Georgia. JICA, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, was
asked to focus on road infrastructure in West Georgia, i.e., the coastal
region. ADB, the Asian Development bank, would make the renewal of
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regional water utilities its priority. EBRD, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, would focus on the energy and ﬁnan-
cial sectors, while KfW, the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, would help
reform and rebuild the energy sector infrastructure. If any of these institu-
tions chose to get active in other areas, it was at their own risk. The
government would take no responsibility for such off-agenda initiatives,
neither for the projects themselves nor for the loans used to ﬁnance them.
Initially, the IFIs were opposed to this approach. They would have
preferred a diversiﬁed portfolio of projects and regulatory debates so they
would always have something to report to headquarters. But eventually,
they saw that our clear-cut approach was more effective and more efﬁcient.
Because they devoted their full attention to the areas of priority we had
assigned them, all the resident IFI representatives soon had major success
stories to report. It’s simple really: if you are placing one big bet, rather
than a large number of small ones, you will do everything to see it succeed.
But coordination was only one aspect of how the government took con-
trol of IFI aid. Additionally, the relevant minister had to demonstrate to
the government, for every proposed grant or loan, that the respective
project would beneﬁt the country and would not cause any additional
regulatory burden. During the ﬁrst few months after this rule was put in
place, almost 90 percent of all such proposals were rejected. But before
long, both the IFIs and the relevant government agencies understood that
proposing a project that would not advance the government’s agenda was
futile.
In fact, the system worked so well that it attracted additional funds to
Georgia. After a while, IFIs offered to increase their investment in Georgia
in case any of the neighboring countries did not fully utilize their allotted
funds. In the end, Georgia received more ﬁnancing from IFIs than it was
pledged during the 2008 donor conference in Brussels.
3.3.1.5 Lessons Learned
The energy sector is, perhaps, the most instructive example of how IFI
projects can add value when the government coordinates them. When I
became Minister of Energy, I found that IFIs had written up a number of
development plans for the energy sector. These plans, however, partly
contradicted each other and none of them was applicable to the situation
in Georgia. Had Georgia followed one of these plans, it would still be a
blacked-out country today. But when we, as the government, sat down
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with IFI representatives to discuss and determine the real needs of the
energy sector in Georgia, the results were outstanding. Examples of
successful projects that drove sustainable change in the sector include:
• Renewal of hydroelectric power plants
• Construction of new transmission lines
• Metering program for distribution companies
• Implementation of management contracts
The reform of the energy sector was a major driver of change for the
better in Georgia. Examples of similarly successful IFI-backed projects
include the construction of highways and local regional roads, water
utility renewal, and the injection of capital into Georgia’s banking sector
to offset the effects of the world ﬁnancial crisis and the Russian invasion.
These were all landmark projects that prepared the ground for private
sector development, jumpstarted the economy, and gave conﬁdence to
investors. All successful projects had three things in common:
1. Close coordination between IFIs and the government
2. Focus of each IFI on a speciﬁc sector or major project
3. Full commitment of the government to these projects
Can our experience in Georgia help shape IFI activities in other develop-
ing countries? I believe that it can. IFIs have huge ﬁnancial resources that
can make a big difference in the developing world. I believe that such aid is
most effective, and most efﬁcient, when IFIs ask a few fundamental ques-
tions before they start spending money. Why not cooperate with a coun-
try’s elected government instead of pushing a particular agenda? Why not
focus on major infrastructure projects that will accelerate private sector
development and attract further investments, rather than build a huge
portfolio of sub-critical projects? Why not pursue broad objectives, such as
GDP growth and a decrease in unemployment, instead of pushing a
particular regulatory agenda? Why not hire top consultants for speciﬁc
studies, rather than try to do everything in-house?12 Why not support the
implementation of new management contracts for state-owned enterprises
to ﬁght corruption, introduce a modern management style, nurture new
generations of leaders, and import know-how from other countries? And
ﬁnally, why not take civil servants from developing countries on study
tours to other countries to enable them to learn from successful reformers,
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rather than offer grants to write new regulation? Once civil servants see
with their own eyes what a speciﬁc reform is all about, they will be in a
great position to adapt the underlying principles to their own country. I
believe that enabling local ofﬁcials to turn things around is a much more
sustainable form of assistance than writing laws. If you give people a ﬁsh,
you feed them for a day. As the saying goes: if you teach them how to ﬁsh,
you feed them for a lifetime. I believe that reﬂecting on these questions
will help IFIs in their efforts to make the world a better place.
3.3.2 No More Chinese Walls?
Time and again, careless governments have allowed inﬂation to run wild
by printing money, especially prior to elections, when economic growth
and decreasing interest rates are more important than the ﬁght against
inﬂation. As a direct result of such shortsighted, irresponsible behavior,
central banks have gained positions of total independence as guardians of
the currency. Ever since Paul Volcker, Chairman of the U.S. Federal
Reserve under Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, successfully battled the
surging inﬂation by increasing the policy rate against the expectations of
the government in the 1980s,13 few people have challenged the indepen-
dence of central banks and their right to oversee monetary policy.
However, economic challenges are changing, and economic policy
should evolve in step with these changes. Today, inﬂation is not the
biggest issue anymore in most of the developed world. Instead, many
countries are facing a threat of deﬂation and struggling with a demand-
driven deceleration of the economy. While I don’t suggest that govern-
ments return to a regime of printing money at will, I think it’s time to tear
down the Chinese walls that have been erected to limit cooperation and let
central banks and governments work together in the best interest of their
countries. In some cases, the independence of central banks is very useful,
especially to prevent dangerously high inﬂation rates. In other cases,
however, close cooperation between a country’s central bank and its ﬁscal
authority (typically the ministry of ﬁnance) can be much more effective
than the independent actions of either entity. May be it is time to break
down taboo and consider the following policies:
1. Expand the objectives for central banks from inﬂation prevention to
inﬂation prevention and economic growth.
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2. Establish a council consisting of the heads of ﬁscal and monetary
authorities and maybe even the head of government. Have the
council convene regularly to review the development of the national
economy.
3. Every two to three years, put in place an agreement between the
central bank and the ministry of ﬁnance, outlining the key para-
meters of ﬁscal and monetary policy.
4. Empower this council to implement all necessary measures needed
for the given stage of development of the economy, may it be
managing the supply of money through coordinated measures or
giving funds directly to the government, provided there is consensus
among the members of the council (so-called helicopter money).
Currently, many countries have no mechanism to fund the government’s
budget directly by printing money, even if all parties agree that this is the
right thing to do in a given situation. But why punish future generations
for mistakes governments made decades ago?
Critics will say that governments might be tempted to abuse the con-
trolled collaborative approach I propose, especially in developing coun-
tries, where checks and balances are not well developed and institutions
are relatively weak. That may be the case, and I’m all for precautions that
will help avoid such abuse. But what critics don’t see is that it is already
going on – behind closed doors anyway. Formally, central banks in many
developing countries are independent, in line with the rules and regula-
tions that have been established in compliance with the requirements of
IFIs or developed countries. But in reality, central banks and governments
in many countries are cooperating closely, often, but not always, with the
best interest of the national economy in mind. I believe that such off-the-
record dealings should cease, and that they should be replaced by clear,
transparent rules and regulations for cooperation. I am convinced that all
parties would beneﬁt from such an arrangement, including the central
banks. Speciﬁcally, formalized cooperation would lead to more balanced
decisions and shared responsibilities. Today, the heads of central banks
often act as lone warriors, even where supervisory boards exist. As a result,
decisions that might be perceived as painful or unpopular are frequently
delayed or avoided. The joint council that I propose would be better
equipped to deal with challenges that affect not only the currency but
also the entire economic stance of a country, in a timely and effective
fashion.
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This was the case in Georgia, and it helped us overcomemultiple crises and
challenges. Even though there was no legally established council between the
government and the National Bank of Georgia, and no contracts had been
signed by these institutions, cooperation was very close. In many cases, ﬁscal
andmonetary policies were coordinated. This approachwas particularly useful
during the economic growth period and when the world ﬁnancial crisis hit
Georgia in the aftermath of the Russian invasion (2009 and 2010). Joint
efforts by the government and the National Bank of Georgia helped Georgia
emerge from the crisis faster, and in better shape, than any other country in
the region.
3.3.3 Inﬂation Can Be an Asset
Even though inﬂation targeting is the main policy of many central banks,
still the targets themselves mostly are not derived from the best possible
mix of economic growth and acceptable level of inﬂation. As it has
already been mentioned previously, central banks are charged with a
gatekeeper-from-inﬂation role, and for them keeping inﬂation as low as
possible is the top priority – not taking in consideration the economic
growth forgone due to such policies. Let me take the argument against
overly rigid inﬂation control one step further. I believe that moderate
inﬂation can be a good thing – not any kind of inﬂation, and not in all
situations of course. In the twentieth century, inﬂation has wrecked
many economies and inﬂicted incredible hardship on many people. But
I have also seen inﬂation act as an investment accelerator, and I think
governments should take advantage of this phenomenon. While high
inﬂation is bad, deﬂationary pressure can also have detrimental effects on
the economy – less dramatic perhaps, but potentially more prolonged.
And if demand-driven economic slowdown and deﬂationary pressure
coincide, even strong economies can suffer and ﬁnd themselves facing a
recession. Examples include Japan, for the past three decades, and the
European Union, for almost past decade.
Look at it this way. Assume you want to buy a house. Prices go down,
so you decide to wait a while. You want to get a good deal, and what is the
harm in holding out for a few weeks? An investor considering to buy
another company will behave in much the same way, hoping that the
valuation of the target will decrease. Or put yourself in the shoes of a
manufacturing company. You need to buy materials, but consumer prices
are now lower than they were when you made your proﬁt calculations, and
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they are still declining. Assume that manufacturing the ﬁnished products
takes some time. Won’t you hesitate to buy those costly materials when
you don’t know whether you will be able to generate enough revenues to
cover your costs and turn a proﬁt in the end? In a deﬂationary period,
economies frequently slow down because of the cumulative effect of such
delayed decisions (“investment decision gap”).14 During a period of
moderate inﬂation, this effect is reversed. The house buyer, the investor,
and the manufacturer will all seek to move quickly and close their deals
when they see prices going up.
The case for an acceptable level of inﬂation – see following text for what
I consider “acceptable” – is even stronger for developing countries. They
beneﬁt from nominal GDP growth, if only because of the psychological
effect it has on market participants. Of course, inﬂation does not bring real
GDP growth. But let’s face it: many international investors look at nom-
inal GDP per capita as their most basic indicator of whether a given
country even deserves their attention. Because of such ﬁltering, it can
make all the difference for a developing country to which nominal GDP
per capita bracket it is allocable: Below USD 1000? 1000 to 5000? 5000
to 10,000? Above 10,000? Many investors will not give a second thought
to why exactly a given country suddenly pops up on their GDP radar as a
middle-income country, or even a higher middle-income country. Is it due
to a slightly higher inﬂation rate, or because of real economic growth?
An additional beneﬁt of moderate inﬂation is the fact that it can lift part
of the burden of social expenditure. Inﬂation increases nominal tax rev-
enue. And if a country’s formulas for welfare and social support do not
account for inﬂation, social expenditure stays the same, leaving the gov-
ernment with additional funds. The surplus can be used for investments or
increases in social assistance, as warranted by the political situation.
So what is an “acceptable” level of inﬂation? I believe that the accep-
table rate is contingent on a country’s speciﬁc situation and recent eco-
nomic history. If market participants have had – and still remember – an
experience of an inﬂation rate of x percent hurting their businesses and
their livelihoods, then x is too high a rate. Generally, the highest accep-
table level of inﬂation is the rate beyond which savings increase only
because of inﬂation. It is the level beyond which individuals and business
grow fearful of hyperinﬂation and start spending less, consuming less, and
saving more. It is the level beyond which market participants lose their
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faith in a stable future. For Georgia, that rate is somewhere under 9–10
percent. When inﬂation exceeded that level in the past, we saw decreased
consumption, decreased economic activity, and increased uncertainty.
And uncertainty, as I have demonstrated previously, is the biggest
enemy of sustained economic growth in any country.
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11. Georgia was promised special aid from IFIs after the Russian invasion, an
important factor that helped uphold national morale and instill conﬁdence
in investors. However, the bulk of the funds that IFIs had promised did not
actually reach Georgia until late 2010, or even early 2011, when Georgia
was already on a path to recovery of its own accord.
12. The best experts in many technical areas are typically employed by private
sector companies, often simply because IFIs cannot pay top salaries for
political reasons.
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